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Abstract: This paper presents an approach to mathematical terms
similar to the approach developed by Kripke in order to deal with
natural kind terms; in fact, I argue that mathematical terms are
natural kind terms in the sense of Kripke. Thus, I suggest that,
from a semantic perspective, such terms should be seen as primarily
referring terms, and, from a metaphysical perspective, that good
definitions of such terms should embody structural information
about the exemplars from the kind in question.
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Resumo: Este artigo apresenta uma abordagem de termos matemáti-
cos semelhante à abordagem desenvolvida por Kripke para lidar com
termos de tipo natural; na verdade, eu defendo que termos matemá-
ticos são termos de tipo natural no sentido de Kripke. Assim, sugiro
que, a partir de uma perspectiva semântica, tais termos devem ser
vistos principalmente como termos referentes, e, de uma perspectiva
metafísica, que boas definições de tais termos devem incorporar infor-
mações estruturais sobre os exemplares do tipo em questão.
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There are at least two approaches
to natural kinds: first, we can
approach them from a semantic
point of view, studying the seman-
tics of terms which denote natural
kinds. Second, we can approach
them from a metaphysical point
of view, investigating the structure
of the exemplars of a given kind.
In this paper, I will make some
suggestions about how some of
Kripke’s ideas about natural kinds
can be adapted to the mathema-
tical case. I will start with the
semantic approach and then use
some of the issues arising from it
to motivate the metaphysical ap-
proach as well. I qualify my re-
marks here as suggestions, instead
of arguments, to indicate their
provisional nature; much more
needs to be done about this sub-
ject, and I will finish by pointing
in what seems to me to be promi-
sing directions for further study.
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Semantics
Let us start then with a quick
review of Kripke’s ideas regar-
ding the semantics of natural
kind terms. Following traditional
usage, I call the semantic value of
a term the term’s contribution to
the determination of the truth va-
lue of the sentences in which it oc-
curs. Before Kripke’s work, it was
common to identify the seman-
tic value of a natural kind term
with a description, or a cluster
of descriptions, satisfied only by
the extension of the term in ques-
tion. In other words, it was com-
mon to identify the semantic va-
lue of a natural kind term with
what could be called its descriptive
content, how the term is used to
describe a given feature of reality.
Kripke’s main thesis, then, is
that the semantic value of a natu-
ral kind term is not its descriptive
content, but rather its reference—
a natural kind term is used not
to describe a given feature of rea-
lity, but to name it. That is, for
Kripke, a natural kind term is not
synonymous to a description, or
cluster of descriptions, which is
associated to the term by speakers
of the language in which the term
occurs. In particular, this means
that its reference is not determi-
ned by whether some objects sa-
tisfy a given description (or clus-
ter of descriptions), but rather by
another mechanism. Since this
mechanism is important for what
follows, let us take a quick look at
how Kripke motivates it.
Initially, according to Kripke, a
term acquires reference by way of
a “baptism ceremony”, in which
a person declares, for instance, “I
will call this stuff by the term
‘gold”’ or “I will call by ‘gold’
this yellow, metallic stuff” (in the
first case, the reference is fixed by
a demonstrative indication, whe-
reas in the second case it is fi-
xed by description). After this
“ceremony”, the reference of a
term is transmitted by a histori-
cal chain whose first link is the
ceremony: as the speakers of a
language intend to use the term
with the same reference as the bap-
tizer, this reference gets transmit-
ted along the community, even if
those employing the term are mis-
taken with respect to which des-
cription was used to fix this refe-
rence. That is why, to Kripke, refe-
rence takes precedence to descrip-
tion: we use a term first to refer to
“this object here” or “to that ob-
ject referred by (whomever)”, and
only later we associate a descrip-
tion to the term. Otherwise put,
we use a term because it refers to
a given object (because we want to
speak about this object, and not
another one), and not because we
associate to it a certain descrip-
tion.
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As a consequence, we obtain
what is usually called the stabi-
lity of reference: the reference of a
natural kind term is stable across
changes in the descriptions asso-
ciated with the term. For exam-
ple, perhaps in the past the des-
cription associated with the term
“gold” was something like “yel-
low metal”, whereas now it is
“chemical element with atomic
number 79”. But this change
in the associated description does
not alter the semantic value of the
term, as we still refer to the same
substances as gold.
The above is a very brief sketch
of Kripke’s views (which I will
not defend here), but it will suf-
fice for my purposes. What
I want to suggest is that this
view can be applied to mathe-
matical terms as well. In par-
ticular, I want to suggest that
at least some interesting exam-
ples of mathematical terms—such
as “continuous”—are examples of
natural kind terms, in the sense
sketched above. Of course, I do
not want to suggest that every
mathematical predicate is a natu-
ral kind term (which is absurd).
But I do want to suggest that
the widespread view according to
which most, if not all, mathe-
matical definitions are stipulati-
ons or conventions that determine
the semantic value of the defined
terms is mistaken. According to
this view, the semantic value of a
mathematical term would be the
result of a decision on the part of
the mathematical community, in
such a way that there would be an
arbitrary component in the corres-
ponding concepts. Against this, I
want to suggest that the degree of
arbitrariness involved in the defi-
nition of a mathematical term is
generally very low.
Let us consider a typical exam-
ple, the notion of something being
continuous. An idealized version
of the history of this notion is
as follows: initially, mathematici-
ans isolated an interesting mathe-
matical class, noticing that they
all satisfied a property that they
called “continuity” (very roughly,
these objects were lines or cur-
ves that could be drawn without
lifting the pencil from the pa-
per). The first characterizations
of this class were derived from
what we could call its phenome-
nal qualities, such as “being gene-
rated by the uninterrupted move-
ment of a point”. However, es-
pecially in the 19th century, de-
velopments tied to the represen-
tation of infinite series of functi-
ons and the generalization of cer-
tain concepts from real to com-
plex analysis led to a deeper in-
vestigation of this class of functi-
ons. There were at least two go-
als: first, to obtain a definition of
continuity that only used intrinsi-
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.6, n.2, dez. 2018, p. 7-13
ISSN: 2317-9570
9
DANIEL ARGAVE NAGASE
cally mathematical concepts and,
second, to obtain a definition that
could reveal a deep structural fact
that explained why this class of
functions is so fruitful. Both of
these goals were achieved by the
celebrated Weierstrass definition
of continuity in terms of “espilons
and deltas”.
One lesson I want to draw from
this narrative is the following.
Suppose, for vividness, that one
were to show Newton and Wei-
erstrass paradigmatic examples of
functions (say, the trigonometric
functions, or a given polynomial).
It is uncontroversial that they
would agree in their classification
of certain functions as continuous
in the great majority of cases. That
is, in the great majority of cases
they would agree that the same
functions were, or were not, con-
tinuous. But according to the des-
criptivist, who holds that the se-
mantic value of a term is determi-
ned by the description associated
to it, this agreement would be il-
lusory, since Newton and Weiers-
trass associate different descrip-
tions to the term “continuous”,
and hence actually mean different
things by it. Indeed, according
to this descriptivist, what we have
above is not the history of the con-
tinuity notion, since there is no
such a notion, but rather a suc-
cession of notions each attached
to the term “continuous”. That
is, the term “continuous” would
be ambiguous. On the other hand,
if we adopt Kripke’s views, there
is no difficulty in saying that we
do have the same notion across
our narrative, a notion whose pro-
perties were progressively deter-
mined by mathematical investiga-
tion.
Another lesson to draw from
the history of the mathematical
notion of continuity is that there
is little that is arbitrary in Wei-
erstrass’s definition. It is not
that Weierstrass stipulated that,
thereafter, a continuous function
would be one that satisfied such
and such a property. Indeed, that
this was not the case is easily seen
by the fact that practically every
mathematician involved in the in-
vestigation of the foundations of
mathematics in the 19th century
agreed that a good definition of
a continuous function would have
to satisfy certain conditions (no-
tably, it would have to imply the
intermediate value theorem). Of
course, such conditions were me-
rely necessary, but not sufficient
(not even jointly sufficient) con-
ditions for a function to be con-
tinuous. But they did point to
the demand that a good definition
of continuity should explain why
the continuous functions satisfied
these conditions.
I cannot resist adding a further
example of this idea, this time
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a little too contentious. It se-
ems to me that Turing’s analy-
sis of computability in terms of
Turing machines fits exactly the
pattern described above. Mathe-
maticians had long been interes-
ted in algorithms, and had alre-
ady isolated a large class of functi-
ons as being algorithmically com-
putable. Some of these were pa-
radigmatic, and Turing’s defini-
tion captured exactly what made
them paradigmatic, by describing
the computation process behind
such functions. This points to
a third lesson to be drawn from
the above narrative. A mathema-
tical definition is successful not
when it matches some kind of pre-
theoretic definition, or intuition,
of a given concept. This would be
to accept the descriptivist thesis,
according to which the definition
would merely spell out the des-
criptive content of the term being
defined. Against the descripti-
vist, I hold that in most cases it
may be that there was no “pre-
theoretic” or “intuitive” descrip-
tion corresponding to the term. So
the widespread view, according to
which Turing’s thesis is “unprova-
ble”, because the “intuitive” no-
tion of computability is not rigo-
rous enough to allow one to prove
the equivalence between it and
Turing’s rigorous definition, gets
things exactly backwards. There
was no intuitive notion of compu-
tability, but rather there were pa-
radigmatic instances, and the rigo-
rous definition is successful to the
extent that it explains what ma-
kes such instances paradigmatic,
what common characteristic holds
together all those objects. Again,
this is precisely what Turing did.
Metaphysics
The picture adumbrated above ac-
cords well with certain Aristote-
lian strands in Kripke’s descrip-
tion of the scientific endeavor. Ac-
cording to this description, re-
searchers start by grouping to-
gether certain objects that share
given features (generally pheno-
menal qualities)—what the Aris-
totelians call a predicate profile.
This predicate profile allows us
to infer that such objects form
a natural kind. In the second
phase of the inquiry, one then
looks for structural features—the
essence, according to Kripke—of
these objects, features that ex-
plain why the objects in question
share this predicate profile. It
is those structural features that
ground the phenomenal qualities
of the objects and explain why
the initial sample constitutes a
kind. Of course, in many cases the
phenomenal qualities were misle-
ading, and one is then led to rec-
tify the initial characterization of
the kind.
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From the metaphysical point of
view, it is common to level the
charge against Kripke that the no-
tion of essence he employs is so-
mewhat obscure. This is a curious
charge, since his notion of essence
is perfectly in order—a property is
essential to an object if it is neces-
sary that the object has that pro-
perty. The problem with Kripke’s
notion of essence is not that it is
obscure, but rather that it is ina-
dequate. In our particular mathe-
matical context, this inadequacy is
glaring, since every property of a
mathematical object is (presuma-
bly) necessary, whence every pro-
perty would be essential to the ob-
ject. This points to a demand for a
new notion of essence that could
fulfill the explanatory role indica-
ted above.
To develop such a notion of es-
sence is an enormous task, one
that I will excuse myself from dis-
charging here. Instead, I would
like to merely indicate some pos-
sible ideas for further develop-
ment. First, it seems to me that
one thing we can draw from the
above narrative is that this notion
of essence would have to be tied
to the structural characteristics of
the object. It is extremely dif-
ficult to make this more precise
in a non-trivial manner, but some
attempts in this direction have
been carried out by those who,
following Kit Fine’s example, are
articulating a kind of Aristote-
lian hylemorphism. The idea here
is to develop a rich enough no-
tion of form that could distinguish
between a mere heap or aggre-
gate from a full-blown integra-
ted object, and use this notion of
form to specify the essence of a
kind as its formal features. In the
mathematical case, these formal
features would then explain why
the kind in question is natural,
by exhibiting a common property
that explained why certain theo-
rems hold of the given kind (e.g.
Bolzano explicitly introduced his
definition of continuity in order
to explain the intermediate value
theorem). This last aspect is rela-
ted to some problems in the phi-
losophy of mathematical explana-
tion: an informative proof would
be one that exploited an essential
feature of a given kind in order
to derive a further property of the
kind.
Regardless of whether a viable
notion of essence can be develo-
ped, it seems clear, however, that
the search for structural charac-
teristics of mathematical objects
is a driving force behind much
mathematical research. One area
in which related ideas have been
very fertile is model theory. Take,
for example, the characterization
of ℵ0-categorical theories as those
with finitely many n-types for
each n. This characterization
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points to an initial description of
a class of theories (all their coun-
table models are isomorphic) and
proceeds to relate this to structural
properties of the theories them-
selves (for each n, the space of
n-types is finite), which explains
why the initial description holds
(this is very rough, but intuiti-
vely the space of n-types controls
how much variation there can be
between models of the same the-
ory; so the smaller the space, the
smaller the variation—the limit
case here is when the space is
compact and discrete, which im-
plies that there can be no vari-
ation). The success of this pro-
gram for the countable case sug-
gests that perhaps we could at-
tempt the general case; Shelah’s
classification program is precisely
the extension of such ideas to the
general case.
Such remarks are obviously
very inchoate and were intended
to be merely suggestive. But I do
hope to have convinced the reader
that there is at least something to
this approach. If not, I must apo-
logize for the time misspent!
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